


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US ARMY INTELLIGENCE AGENCY FOREIGN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTER



INITIATIVE REPORT

CHINESE FORCE PLANNING FOR THE YEAR 2000:
THE STRATEGIC RATIONALE FOR SCIENTIFIC
AND TECHNOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION (U)

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CHINESE FORCE PLANNING FOR THE YEAR 2000: THE STRATEGIC
RATIONALE FOR SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL MODERNIZATION (U)

AUTHOR
~~[REDACTED]~~

5 USC 552 (b) (6)

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
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PREFACE



(U) Constructive comments, criticisms, or suggested changes are encouraged, and should be forwarded to the Commander, US Army Foreign Science and Technology Center, 220 Seventh Street, NE., Charlottesville, VA 22901-5396 (ATTN: AIFPO).

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SUMMARY

(S) The Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) has been reevaluating its doctrine and strategy to accommodate changes in the political, economic, and technological environment.

Chief among these is that the increased lethality of nuclear and large-scale conventional war makes these types of warfare less likely in the future.

At the same time, the priority given to economic construction has prompted PLA leaders to concentrate on refurbishing their military industrial infrastructure and on raising professional standards of the remaining forces. Consequently, the PLA has promoted the study of foreign military methods, selective importation of weapon systems, and production of weapons for export.

This action may hinder the PLA from accomplishing the objectives described in the report. To the extent that Western responses to the incidents in Tienanmen Square inhibits access to trade and technology, the PLA has compromised its own force modernization objectives. The problems facing the PLA, however, remain urgent.

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1. Introduction (U)

a. (S NOFORN INTELL) [REDACTED]

b. (S NOFORN INTELL) [REDACTED]

c. (U NOFORN) In an attempt to increase efficiency and productivity in their industrial facilities, the Chinese have begun to merge civilian and military industries. The former defense industrial ministries have become corporations responsible for their own profits and losses. This development has led to a redefinition of the scope of authority of the National Defense Science, Technology, and Industry Commission (NDSTIC). It has hitherto played a decisive role in setting the terms of foreign technology transfer. Recently, the services have presented their own needs directly to the defense industry producers. The industries will accept indirect guidance from the NDSTIC, but they will be directly responsible to the designated state ministries.

d. (U NOFORN) The NDSTIC occupies the second level of decision-making in China's defense industrial structure, along with the General Staff Department (GSD), the General Logistics Department (GLD), the General Political Department (GPD), the State Planning Commission (SPC), and the Budget and Finance Department (BFD). The NDSTIC is a coordinating, not a controlling, body; it facilitates contact between various industries and the military and oversees production. In this role it reviews proposals from the different military services to determine their feasibility, their utility, and the availability of funds for capital construction and research and development (R&D). The State Council then approves the proposals so that the NDSTIC can direct the SPC to go ahead with the projects. The NDSTIC appropriates resources and issues orders for their implementation, but it does not directly influence PLA weapon acquisition policies (fig 1).

e. (S NOFORN INTELL NOFORN) PLA leaders have initiated high priority programs for technology transfer and the long-term refurbishment of the indigenous industrial base through technology transfer agreements with other countries. The PLA is acquiring specific pieces of equipment to upgrade their current inventory. Improvement will be gradual; they will be unable to match the Soviets in the quality of weapons before the year 2000.

f. (S NOFORN INTELL) The PLA is also reinvigorating advanced educational institutions for theoretical studies. It is raising the stature of professional training and technical competence in the officer corps. Senior PLA leaders have strongly advocated that the military academies modify courses on doctrine and strategy which reflect the technological changes that will radically alter the future battlefield. Field officers add credibility to the courses on strategy

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by referring to their own combat experience examples from their own combat experience. They also advise researchers who analyze information on foreign technological, organizational, and operational modifications on new weapon systems.

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


Figure 1. (U) Military and Civilian Defense Related Organizations

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2. The "Year 2000" Report and Defense Modernization Policy (U)

a. Key Concepts Contained in the "Year 2000" Report (U).

(1) ~~(S) NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE~~ [REDACTED]

(2) ~~(S) NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE~~ [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The previous Maoist strategy of people's war had required the political, economic, and military mobilization of the masses to augment the regular forces in a protracted war on Chinese territory. Current PLA leaders have adopted the formula of people's war under modern conditions to justify innovations in the organization and purposes of the armed forces. The reformulated strategy of active defense involves quick response and forward projection of troops which provides a better defense of China's industrial facilities than the previous people's war strategy, which had allowed territorial incursions followed by mass mobilization and protracted defense in depth.

(3) ~~(S) NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE~~ [REDACTED] elements of the principles of people's war under modern conditions to maintain continuity and political orthodoxy. It specifies five functions:

- Prevent the outbreak of war and preserve peace.
- Guide combat operations to fully exploit the power of people's war.
- Guide defense modernization to build up a powerful people's army.
- Guide the study of military science to develop companion tactics for people's war.
- Promote the development of science and technology to stimulate the growth of the national economy.

(4) ~~(S) NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE~~ [REDACTED]

(5) ~~(S) NOT FOR PUBLIC RELEASE~~ [REDACTED]

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(U) (6) ~~SECRET~~ This strategic outline complements the PLA's concrete steps to regularize its force structure. The recent establishment of a formal system of reservists marks a transition from the past emphasis on a mass militia system in preparation for a major war. A new noncommissioned officer system will become a prominent feature of the PLA's structure. In close conjunction, the new accent on developing rapid reaction units foresees that strategic reserve divisions will be combined with the provincial military subdistricts to improve the border defense system and the command structure.

(U) (7) ~~SECRET~~ The Chinese are reevaluating the probability of a Soviet attack in Asia. They are now adopting a less confrontational stance along the Sino-Soviet border, partly in response to limited Soviet force reductions and partly out of a general objective to establish stable relations with both the United States and the USSR for the sake of domestic economic development. Moreover, the perceived strategic stalemate between the superpowers has provided time to construct a viable economic base with which to support a weapon modernization program. Lack of armed conflict for a lengthy period has not led the Chinese to alter their fundamental perception that the Soviet Union, being a potentially hostile "hegemonic" power, will remain the major strategic threat. At the same time, the lessons of the campaigns against Vietnam and India have spurred the Chinese to restructure and redeploy their forces, and to emphasize combined-arms and mobile troop units. However, high level debates on the suitability of these proposed changes in doctrine and strategy continue.

b. Development and Implementation of Concepts (U).

(U) (1) ~~SECRET~~ The PLA is interested in foreign force structure models, such as US, NATO, and Soviet lightly equipped and rapidly deployable assault units and joint service forces. The PLA is consequently testing these force structures to develop smaller, specialized units to engage in mobile surprise operations. In this way, the field commanders must learn how to switch quickly from defensive to offensive modes of combat and to employ high-technology weapons in diverse operational environments.

(2) ~~SECRET~~ For example, in the 19 September 1986 edition of the Liberation Army Daily (LAD), the Chengdu Military Region Commander Zhang Taiheng published, an essay entitled "Determining the Objective Is a Question of First Importance in the Study of Campaign Theory." Whereas previous PLA strategy had focused on the destruction of the enemy's main forces on the battlefield, Zhang maintained that in the future the emphasis should be on eliminating the enemy's ability to conduct in-depth operations. On 5 June 1987, in an article entitled "Combining a Streamlined Army with a Powerful Reserve Force," he noted that defense mobilization for future wars requires highly integrated civilian and military resources. In the event of a need for national mobilization, the CMC has prepared plans to activate regular and reserve troops. Given the environment of the interlocked battlefield, where there will be no clear distinction between front and rear operations, reserves trained in special tactical operations will function as vital components in support of main-force joint-service army operations.

(3) ~~SECRET~~ In this endeavor to rework doctrine and strategy, ground-force field commanders are providing defense research analysts with realistic scenarios to support research and wargaming. The ideas derived from these experiences may become embodied in the strategic concepts which will influence subsequent decisions on the production and deployment of

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arms.

3. Evolving PLA Military Theory (U)

a. Evolution of People's War Doctrine (U).

(1) [REDACTED] Rather than preparing for an imminent nuclear war, the PLA is now focusing on regional, small-scale, low-intensity conflicts. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The variety of battlefield situations which the PLA has encountered against Vietnam and India has convinced the Chinese of the growing lethality of small-scale conventional warfare. These experiences have not only given the PLA more opportunities to field test units under new combat conditions, but also have highlighted areas of persistent logistical and equipment weaknesses. [REDACTED]

In early 1979, General Su Yu called for a realistic understanding of the laws and conduct of war. He maintained that in those instances where the people's war doctrine does not meet the future needs of the PLA, it must either be supplemented with new ideas and methods or be partially discarded. He explicitly rejected the mass mobilization strategy of defense in depth associated with people's war in favor of a forward line of defense that utilizes mechanized forces. [REDACTED]

(3) (U) Later that year, Defense Minister Xu Xiangqian asserted that, because science and technology are redefining the shape of future wars, the PLA must improve its inferior technological position. He cautioned, however, that without a proper doctrinal foundation to direct military modernization, the PLA could find itself in a position similar to that of the French before World War II. The French had modern weapons, but lacking an appropriate doctrine, the commanders were unable to resist the German offensive. This example was meant to convince PLA leaders of the need to overhaul Mao's doctrine and make it serviceable in the changed strategic circumstances.

(4) (U) The acknowledged need to overhaul strategy led in 1985 to an examination on how to improve the quality of strategic research in military academies. Confusion stemmed from reliance on broad generalizations, an unwillingness to deviate from Mao's strategic thought, an absence of systematic and rigorous methods of analysis, a tendency to overrate the usefulness of Chinese classical military thought, limited information exchanges among universities, and a hesitation to incorporate foreign ideas.

(5) (U) To break the grip of convention, several reforms were proposed. Rather than use philosophical and ideological approaches to military research, analysts were to use scientifically-based methods. The R&D centers were to facilitate this transition by introducing modern research tools such as computers. The strategic community was encouraged to exchange ideas with foreign scholars and military men and to develop working relationships with foreign military institutions. Members of this community needed to institute links encompassing both research institutes and active military units in the research process to increase the interchange of knowledge and ideas.

(6) (U) Setting aside the extreme elements of people's war, the PLA initiated inquiries in the fields of national strategy, military strategy, the renovation of the defense industrial sector, and the development of the armed forces. For the products of these new endeavors in military research to have a discernible impact on force structure, deployment, training, and combat operations, then the military research institutions must establish viable roles as policy-makers and advisory organs to the

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CMC and various PLA headquarters.

(7) (U) In August 1987 a symposium on Mao's military thought was noteworthy for its conspicuously muted references to doctrinaire Marxist-Leninism. The participants called for a creative blend of Mao's military doctrine with the current technical advances. The newly espoused openness to Western scientific and technological improvements was primarily valued for its utility in attaining the goal of a strong self-sufficient national defense industry. Though references to Mao were subdued, Deng Xiaoping's military reform program was praised for embodying the correct relationship between ideological conformity and modernization.

(8) (U) These threads of doctrinal continuity cannot conceal the noticeable shift of recent writings away from the precepts of people's war. The PLA's leaders initially espoused a revised concept of people's war under modern conditions because they realized that, for an effective restructuring of the armed forces, PLA doctrine must be compatible with its material resources and personnel capabilities. This compromise with Maoist doctrine may well be insufficient to deal with the types of changes dictated by the advances in military technology. In July 1987, to commemorate the 60th anniversary of the founding of the PLA, the former Defense Minister Zhang Aiping wrote an article stating that the PLA needed a clearly defined, long-term program for training group armies and developing defense technology and weaponry. Such an extended commitment of people and resources to modernization will require the PLA to produce palpable results that enhance deterrence.

(9) (U) In September 1987 an LAD article entitled "Reform Is the Only Way Out for the Modernization of Our Army" distinguished between valid and erroneous elements of the Maoist legacy. Erroneous elements included mass mobilization for military preparedness and the antagonistic contradiction between revolution and the development of modern weaponry. According to the article, these errors stalled the development of conventional arms technology and vitiated the morale and professional standards of the PLA.

The appearance of group armies and rapid deployment units attests to the development of functionally specific roles for troops based on the technological capabilities of modern weapon systems.

(10) (C/NOMR) The attempt to separate the Party and administrative tasks within the command structure is hindered at all organizational levels of the PLA by the pervasive political commissar system. This system is supposed to enforce subordination of the professional military to the Party. Some veteran Party cadres now, however, fear that the deemphasis of ideological criteria has contributed to a perfunctory attitude toward political indoctrination. The test will be whether the political commissars will confine themselves to the role of overseeing troop morale and mission, or whether they again become engaged in subordinating military questions to political judgments. The public emphasis on the acquisition of technical expertise to raise professional standards still must contend with the ingrained bias of a dual command system in which final authority has often rested with the political authorities.

(11) (C/NOMR)

Nevertheless, the underlying tension concerning the roles of politics and technology, the commissar and the technocrat, cannot be dismissed as irrelevant to the way in which the PLA will conduct future combat operations. Because the commissar system is so entrenched in the Chinese political order, no matter how

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compelling the apparently objective criteria for pragmatic reforms may be, their prospects for success are fraught with uncertainty, given the power of vested political interests.

(12) [REDACTED] In March and May 1988, first vice-minister of the CMC, Zhao Ziyang gave two important addresses concerning reform of the military system and defining "army building," what the US Army would call force development.

[REDACTED] Zhao's speech to the CMC reform forum in March authoritatively stated that henceforth the PLA was to consider armed forces modernization as the core and military training as the focal point. He declared that the People's war concepts espoused by Mao and the late Defense Minister Lin Biao were no longer applicable to strategic military thinking. According to a May article in the Hong Kong paper Wen Wei Po, Zhao stated that the Ministry of National Defense (MND) should restructure the functions of its decision-making organs so that they could do substantive work. On the issue of force structure, he urged the establishment of group armies characterized by speed and flexibility, a fact which supports the contention that the Chinese are preparing a rapid response strategy to counter local wars.

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b. Reform in Methods of Military Modernization (U).

(1) [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] These institutes are attempting to justify the governmental policy of increasing the creation of cooperative relationships with foreign governments and firms for the acquisition of advanced weapons to supplement and to improve domestic defense industrial production capabilities. Even if they are effective in gaining access to technology, the institutes will still suffer from the Chinese proclivity to overestimate their ability to produce complex technological equipment if they are merely given instructions or a prototype.

(2) [REDACTED]

Although in the late 1970's, Chinese military leaders were initially very interested in acquiring advanced weapon technology, realistic budget constraints have prevented them from following-through. China's defense industrial import-export corporations selectively import advanced armaments and high technology prototypes. The PLA is taking an incremental approach toward incorporating these improvements, because the authorities in charge of the defense industries want to upgrade their production capacity without becoming reliant on foreign sources of materials. This preoccupation with achieving self-sufficiency stems from a desire to avoid repeating the experiences of the abrupt Soviet pullout in 1960.

(3) [REDACTED] The emphasis on developing the economy has adversely affected the PLA. By 1988 roughly 1 million men had been demobilized, reducing the army to 2 300 000. The ground forces may undergo further cuts until the PLA leaders have attained a balance between the proficiency of the troops and the capabilities of the weapons.

(4) [REDACTED] To achieve its goal of unit readiness, the PLA has been engaging the troops in extensive training exercises. However, a significant problem has arisen from the policy of maintaining a peaceful international environment for economic development. Given the lack of an imminent threat, preparations for a mid-intensity regional conflict rather than a large scale nuclear engagement are hampered by the difficulty of instilling a sense of mission among the troops. For instance, PLA ground forces have recently reported that group army winter training maneuvers have

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not been conducted smoothly because the officers and troops did not perceive a direct threat to national security.

4. Conclusion (U)

b. ~~TS-NOT FOR FOREIGN NATIONALS OR CONTRACTORS~~ [REDACTED]

The new emphasis on this form of combat indicates a real change in the PLA's perspective. The Chinese are involved in such a redefinition of their strategic orientation and focus partly because of pressing domestic needs and partly because of the changing international environment. There are strong grounds to believe that the national policy of economic revitalization in the civilian and defense sectors is being used to justify this revamping of doctrine and strategy. Furthermore, their study of the trends in international conflict has apparently convinced the Chinese that their scarce resources should be applied mainly to preparing for local and regional conflicts. The acquisition of foreign technology is crucial; however, Chinese defense analysts appear to regard the proper coordination of doctrine and hardware as a prerequisite for an effective defense policy.

b. ~~TS-NOT FOR FOREIGN NATIONALS OR CONTRACTORS~~ [REDACTED]

The continued low budget appropriations for the military signal that the PLA's efforts will be directed toward long-term scientific and technological R&D rather than toward the purchase of expensive foreign arms. The PLA has entered the international arms market to earn hard currency ostensibly to improve its indigenous production facilities. To a significant extent the technological superiority of its potential adversaries' conventional weapons compels the PLA to weigh carefully the options for arms development, procurement, and deployment. The resultant decisions will indicate the extent to which the PLA services, in the implementation of their missions, have progressed from the strategic assumptions and practices of people's war through its revision in people's war under modern conditions to an awareness of the need for a more dynamic strategy in response to the ongoing technological revolution in weapons development.

c. ~~TS-NOT FOR FOREIGN NATIONALS OR CONTRACTORS~~ [REDACTED]

It remains to be seen whether the multiplicity of material resources and the rationalization of the defense industrial sector will actually produce a more coherent and flexible approach to planning for future war.

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
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APPENDIX

DEFENSE RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS INVOLVED
IN THE "YEAR 2000" REPORT (FIG 2) (U)

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Figure 2. (U) Chinese Defense Research Institutions

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1. Academy of Military Sciences (U)

a. (~~SECRET~~)

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b. [REDACTED]

In contrast to the former director of the AMS (Song Shilun, who was a firm proponent of Mao's strategic thought), Zheng Wenhan supports a rigorous and systematic approach to the study of modern military doctrine. During his trip to the United States in 1980, he sought to expand professional military contacts and to incorporate pertinent American defense organizational methods.

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5USC 552 (b) (1)(T)

5USC 552 (b) (1)(T)

5USC 552 (b) (1)(T)

2. National Defense University (NDU) (U)

a. [REDACTED] On 1 September 1986, the PLA Military, Logistics, and Political Academies merged to form the NDU. The Commandant is General Zhang Zhen, who had been the PLA Deputy Chief of Staff. Like Zheng Wenhan of the AMS, Zhang Zhen favors a more professional approach to military doctrine and strategy. His background as both the deputy commandant and commandant of the Nanjing Military Academy, the nation's foremost training institute, led him to call in 1981 for the introduction of foreign training methods, computers, and simulators.

5USC 552 (b) (1)(T)

b. [REDACTED] The NDU trains senior officers and advises the State Council, the GSD, and the CMC on military affairs.

5USC 552 (b) (1)(T)

By granting master's and doctoral degrees in military strategy, the PLA aims to raise the quality of the officer corps.

5USC 552 (b) (1)(T)

c. [REDACTED] The ISS examines issues concerning the development of national military strategies and advises the CMC and the GSD on policy alternatives.

5USC 552 (b) (1)(T)

d. [REDACTED] More so than the AMS, the ISS stresses the study of national security plans in an international political, economic, and military context.

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From the viewpoint of Deputy Director Zhou Borong in 1986, the concept of active defense is an operational guide embodying people's war, which remains a credible underlying principle despite new circumstances. Slowly the military research community is convincing the PLA leadership to accept a rapid response strategy to deal with local wars.

3. Beijing Institute of International Strategic Studies (BIISS) (U)

a. (REF ID: A11001) The BIISS plays an ambiguous, yet significant, role in the GSD and MAC decision-making process. It is an academic body that sponsors research on international strategic questions.

b. (REF ID: A11001) The former President of the BIISS, Wu Xuechian, was the Foreign Minister until April 1988; Xu Xin, the Vice Chairman, is the Deputy Chief of the GSD. Xu Yimin, the Secretary General, was formerly the military attache to the Chinese Embassy in the United States and head of the Chinese delegation to the UN Military Staff Committee.

c. (REF ID: A11001)

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B126 DIA/DX-2 (GROUND)
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B132 DIA/VP-AS1
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B150 DT
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B789 DIA/DB-1H1
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C207 LIMRES
C227 101ST AIRBORNE DIV
C231 2ND ARM DIV
C232 3RD ARM CAV REGT
C233 AF-TCAE
C234 1ST CAV DIV
C235 1ST INF DIV
C241 FIRST US ARMY
C242 US FORCES COMMAND
C246 6TH CAV BDE(AC)
C248 FOURTH US ARMY
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C305 18TH ABN CORPS
C307 24TH INF DIV (M)
C309 500TH MIIG
C314 513TH MI BDE (2)
C320 197TH INF BDE(S)
C348 453D MID (STRAT)
C364 HQ FT DEVENS
C395 INSCOM SAA
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C414 4TH INF DIV
C415 5TH INF DIV (M)
C419 9TH INF DIV
C428 OP TEST&EVAL AGCY
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CS45 ARRCOM
CS62 TRANS SCHOOL
CS69 BRDEC (STRBE-HF)
C620 SRD
C623 USAOG (4)

US ARMY (Continued)

C632 CHEMICAL CENTER
C633 ORDNANCE CTR & SCII
C635 USA ADA CMBT DEVEL
C639 CMBT&TNG DEV DIR
C642 USAAVNDTA
C646 CACDA
C667 USAJFKSWC (4)
C683 INTEL CTR&SCH
C684 USAISD (2)
C697 USA TEST&EVAL COMD
C700 CTF BULLIS
C715 ARMOR CENTER
C747 AIARE
C749 HQAIA
C763 HQDA DAMI-FIT
C768 ITAC (LIBRARY) (3)
C788 HQDA DAMI-FII/S (3)
C801 SIXTH US ARMY
C813 701ST MI BDE
C831 ITAC-WPD-MODELS BR
C832 ITAC-WPD-OPS BR
C833 ITAC-WPD-STRAT BR
C834 ITAC-WPD-TACTIC BR
C841 ITAC-ID-WPN SYS BR
C848 ITAC-CITD-ASSES BR

US NAVY

D002 OP-81(DNM)/CNA
D058 OP-06/PL POL & OPS
D150 CMC (INTP)
D153 PACMISTESTCEN
D184 NAVSTKWARCEN
D202 NAVWARCOL
D217 NAVWPNCEN
D246 NAVSWC (2)
D249 NAVPGSCOL
D263 NOSC
D605 COMSPAWARESYS
D660 NMTC
D900 NAVOPINTCEN
D902 NAVOPINTCEN DET NP
D971 DNI/OP-092

US AIR FORCE

E016 HQ AFIA/INA
E017 USAF/INA9RAND-W)
E018 USAF-INA (RAND-C) (2)
E021 DET 1 AFIA
E100 TAC-480 RTG/INPPD (90)
E104 4513 ATTG/NOI
E130 SE AIR DEF SECTOR
E200 ALASKAN AIR COM
E303 HQ AFIA/INKL
E317 AFCSA/SAMI
E401 AF LOG CMD/IN
E403 AF SYSTEMS CMD/INA
E408 AF WEAPONS LAB/IND
E409 HQ HSD/IN
E411 AERONAUT SYS DIV
E412 SA-ALC-IN

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US AIR FORCE (Continued)

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E500 3480 TCHTW-TTVLC (2)
E503 3305 STUGP-TTGM
E552 6911 ELEC SEC SQ
E556 6917 ELEC SEC GP
E568 6990 ELEC SEC GP
E573 6993 ELEC SEC SQ
E706 HQ ESC-INAM
E726 USAFTAWC/NAL
E730 HQ USAF/XOXWK

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS

F081 438TH MAW/DOI
G005 AFSPACECOM-INXS (3)
H005 USCINCEUR
II101 USAFE 497RTG (IRC)
H300 ODCS IN(USAREUR)
H309 11TH ARM CAV REG
II310 USASETAF
H315 21ST SUPPORT COMD
II317 439TH MID(STRAT)
II333 730TH MI BN
II336 404TH MID (STRAT)
H350 10TH SFB/A
H500 CINCUSNAVEUR
II511 COMSIXTHFLT
H524 HQ V CORPS
H525 HQ VII CORPS (2)
H526 HQ 3RD INF DIV
H527 HQ 8TH INF DIV
H530 HQ 1ST ARMORED DIV
H531 HQ 56TH FA CMD
H532 2D ARMORED DIV CMD
II701 FOSIF ROTA
II704 USAFE/NO
II706 USAFE COIC (2)
J005 USCINCCENT
J005 USCINCLANT
J500 CINCLANTFLT
J582 II MEF
J593 COMOPTEVFOR
J658 CARAIRWING 1
J818 CG SECOND MARDIV
J822 COMSERVGRU 2
J843 COMCARGRU SIX
K007 COMUSJAPAN
K100 PACAF 548 RTG
K101 PACAF/INOI
K115 5TH AF
K117 18TH TFW
K119 DET 1 18 TFW/IN
K202 3 TFW/IN
K203 6TH TAC INTEL GP
K300 JPAC (LIBRARY)
K302 USAWESTCOM
K303 1ST(BN) 1 SFGA (2)
K305 25TH INF DIV

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS (Continued)

K306 WESTCOM SPT DET
K313 IPAC (CODE 1A)
K314 IPAC (CODE PT)
K318 IPAC/AT-4
K320 USARJAPAN
K510 COMNAVFORJAPAN
K515 COMSEVENTHFLT
K525 COMNAVAIRPAC
K612 THIRD MAR DIV
K614 FOURTHMAR
K615 THIRDMAR
K621 NINTIMAR
K632 CG III MEF
K658 COMUSNAVPHIL
K681 DEPCOMOPTEVFORPAC
K710 FOSIF CUBI POINT
L005 HQ SAC (INO)
L041 544 IAS/IAOR
L049 544 IAS/IAOC
L051 544 IAS/IAOI
L101 1 STRAD/TOTI
L103 5 BMW/IN
L107 8 AF/IN
L123 96 BMW/IN
N020 1ST SOCOM
N105 1ST MI CO 1ST SFGA (2)
N110 5TH SFG (A) (2)
N125 10TH SFG(A)
N130 75TH INF RANGR REG
N140 11TH SFG(A)
N141 389TH MI CO (CEWI)
N150 160TH SP OPS AV GP (2)
N165 20TH SFG (ABN) (4)
N175 5TH PSYOP GROUP
N186 245TH PSYOP CO
N187 244TH PSYOP CO

OTHERS

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P005 DOE/DASI (2)
P017 NPIC/EG/TFD/TIB
P018 NPIC/EG/TFD/SUB
P055 CIA/OIR/DSD/DB (25)
P079 STATE INR/PMA
P090 NSA/T515/CDB (5)
P714 IC STAFF
Q008 NTIC
Q420 FTD/SCIS (2)
Q619 MSIC REDSTONE
S001 LANL
S030 FRD LIB OF CONG

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C442 750TH MI BN
C500 TRADOC
CS39 TRADOC ANALYSISCOM
C768 ITAC (LIBRARY)
C772 HQDA DAMI-FIO

US NAVY

D261 NUSC NEWPORT
D650 NSGA SAN VITO

US AIR FORCE

E100 TAC-480 RTG/NPPD
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UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS
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J516 COMSURFWARDEVGRU
J579 4TH MEB
J818 CG SECOND MARDIV
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K342 2ND INF DIV
K413 MAG 12 46C1
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K427 MACG-38
K516 CG 1 MEF
K603 THIRDMAW

UNIFIED AND SPECIFIED COMMANDS (Continued)

K622 CG 5TH MEB
K700 CG 7TH MEB
L051 544 IAS/LAOI (2)
L141 7 AD/IN
N105 1ST MI CO 1ST SFCA
N110 5TH SFG (A)
N150 160TH SP OPS AV GP
N185 305TH PSYOP BN
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